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ABSTRACT
ANDREI KHRAPAVITSKI: The Struggle for Survival of Independent
Newspapers and the Role of New Media during the 2006 Belarus Presidential Elections.
(Under the direction of Lucila Vargas)
The 2006 Presidential race was a watershed for the Belarusian independent press
because the government embarked on cleansing the independent print journalism that had
emerged in 1991, when the country became independent from the Soviet Union. The
election was also marked by the transition of some independent newspapers from print to
online and the vibrant development of citizen journalism in the Belarusian cyberspace.
Based on a case study approach, this Master’s thesis explores the demise of the traditional
press and the emergence of new alternative sources of information that tried to substitute
for the silenced traditional media in Belarus during the period of the 2006 Presidential
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The 2006 Presidential race was a pivotal point in the political life of Belarus, a
small post-Soviet country where Alaksandr Lukashenka, after being president for 12 years,
was for the first time seriously challenged by the opposition, the international community,
and the media (Bulhakau, 2006; Chavusau, 2006). The race was also a watershed for the
Belarusian independent press because the Lukashenka regime embarked on cleansing the
independent print journalism that had emerged in 1991, when the country became
independent from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the presidential race was marked by the
transition of some independent newspapers from print to online and the vibrant
development of citizen journalism in the Belarusian cyberspace. The purpose of this case
study is to examine the Belarusian independent newspapers’ struggle for survival during
the 2006 presidential race and the emergence of alternative (mostly online) sources of
information that attempted to, at least partially, substitute for the newspapers.
A few years earlier, authoritarian regimes in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan ended with a wave of peaceful civil protests commonly referred to as “color
revolutions,” such as the Revolution of Roses in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine. In Belarus, the opposition prepared for a similar scenario, having chosen its own
revolution color – denim to symbolize freedom and resistance to conformity. Most analysts
agree that among the most basic requirements for such non-violent revolutions are the
2following: one, a weak and unpopular state authority; two, a credible opposition able to
attract mass support; three, an active civil society, especially independent media to inform
and mobilize that support; and, four, passive or divided security forces (Anable, 2005).
The Belarusian authorities, however, succeeded in preempting the revolution by
conducting unprecedented arrests of civil and political leaders, closing independent
newspapers, and creating an atmosphere of fear to minimize civil unrest after the elections
(Silitski, 2006). If we examine Belarusian media in terms of their potential audience (i.e.,
circulation of periodicals or number of listeners and viewers of radio and television) in the
first years of Lukashenka’s rule, 95 percent of broadcasting and 90 percent of print media
belonged to the state. However, if we examine these media in Belarus in terms of the
numbers of their outlets, only one quarter of broadcast and two thirds of print media
belonged to the state (Manaev, 1995). Over the 12 years of Lukashenko’s presidency, the
regime gradually cut off the sources of alternative information, thus depriving the
opposition of the necessary levers to interact with the public (Dynko, 2006). But after the
wave of successful color revolutions in the neighboring countries, and with growing
pressure from the West, the regime took preemptive measures to limit even further the
influence and outreach of the independent press. The state-owned newspaper distribution
company, Belposhta, no longer allowed subscriptions to or the distribution of privately
owned, independent newspapers (Khrapavitski, 2006). The reasoning behind the refusals
was straightforward. The monopoly referred to Article 391 of the Civil Law holding that
citizens and juridical entities were free to sign or annul any contract and it was not allowed
to oblige someone to conclude an unwanted agreement. This is how Belposhta explained
its actions to an independent newspaper Tovarishch: “Since the law does not require an
3edition’s inclusion into a subscription catalog, Belposhta upholds its right to select
publications for inclusion and consequent distribution by subscription” (Bastunets, 2006).
Another state monopoly, Belsayuzdruk, refused to have any of these publications sold at
the kiosks it controlled (Khrapavitski, 2006). Its reasoning was similar to that of Belposhta.
The editors of independent newspapers protested, wrote petitions to the highest authorities,
but their appeals and demands were turned down (Klaskouski, 2006).
By the end of the election year, the Belarusian Association of Journalists
(thereinafter, BAJ) counted around 30 private newspapers with political news and a
circulation of more than 999 copies (BAJ, 2007). From 2004 to 2007, the number of
independent newspapers dwindled by more than half (Bastunets, 2007). BAJ explained this
phenomenon as being the result of economic and legal discrimination of the
nongovernmental press. Of the 30 licensed newspapers, 13 publications were not available
via subscription due to Belposhta’s policies, and 16 were not sold in the kiosks of
Belsayuzdruk (BAJ, 2007).
This case study will contribute to understanding the role of citizen journalism and
new media in democratic transformations. Based on a case study approach (Stake, 1995),
this Master’s thesis explores the demise of the traditional press and the emergence of new
alternative sources of information that tried to substitute for the silenced traditional media
in Belarus during the period of the 2006 Presidential Election campaign, from October
2005 to March 25, 2006.
The broad research questions of the study are as follows. How did the Belarusian
traditional media struggle for survival during the 2006 Belarusian Presidential campaign?
4Which alternative sources of information emerged during this period? How did those
alternative information sources try to replace the silenced traditional media?
I organize the thesis in the following way. In chapter 2, I provide political
background information about Belarus, including an overview of the state of the
Belarusian media. The literature review follows in chapter 3, where I explicate the
concepts of independent press and citizen journalism. In chapter 4, I explain the
methodological foundations of the study, present personal background information, and
enumerate limitations of the chosen method.
In chapter 5, The Government’s Attack on the Independent Press, I addresse how
the Belarusian traditional media struggled for survival during the 2006 Belarusian
Presidential campaign. In the chapter, I examine the closure of some independent
newspapers, the distribution ban imposed on others, and the newspapers’ struggle to reach
their audiences under these extreme conditions. The chapter features statistical data
provided by the Belarusian Association of Journalists, Reporters Without Borders,
Freedom House, and narratives of the editors of the repressed Belarusian newspapers. In
addition, the chapter discusses the role of independent media in transitional societies,
compares the Belarusian situation to the transformations in Ukraine and Georgia, where
the undertakings of the opposition forces were successful owing to a greater outreach and
availability of the independent media.
In chapter 6, Emergence and Growth of Alternative Media, I explore the
appearance of new alternative media mostly initiated by ordinary citizens who attempted to
disseminate information about the events in the country during the electoral period. The
chapter discusses the role of the Internet as a new communication platform, the
5phenomenal popularity of Livejournal blogs in Belarus, and the government’s efforts to
impede the proliferation of uncensored Internet content.
Finally, in chapter 7, Conclusion and Implications for the Future, I discuss the
potential of the Internet and new information technologies to contribute to the democratic
transformation in Belarus. The bigger question addressed in the chapter is whether
Belarusian society (or any other) is prepared to transition from print to online media. The
chapter argues that the new technologies may not necessarily lead to preservation of the
values of newspaper journalism, especially its public journalism qualities. There is a
prolific discussion among the American communication scholars and professionals
whether Internet could save traditional media from the gradual demise. The Belarusian




Belarus has recently gone from being the European “terra incognito” to being one
of the top issues of the European Union’s foreign policy (Lobjakas, 2005). Researchers
from within and without Belarus have been exploring what the phenomenon of
Lukashenka was, and who or what could put the country of ten million inhabitants back on
the democratic track. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus’ government has overtly renounced any
efforts to integrate into the European community. The Belarusian president, well-known
for his controversial rhetoric, once said that he would not lead Belarus after the civilized
world, presumably meaning the West. And he proved his position many times by closing
down offices of U.S. and European foundations, and by throwing journalists, NGO
activists, and oppositional politicians in jail. As an alternative to the dominant pro-
European sentiment in the region, President Lukashenka has offered Belarusians a union
with Russia. But the integration process between the two nations has been going on for at
least 10 years, and still the union is incomplete and even feeble. Some scholars argue that
Lukashenka is not going to yield his powers to any supranational formation (Bulhakau,
2003; Dynko, 2004), and thus this entire long-running pro-Russian agenda is his way of
bargaining for economic benefits – cheap gas, oil, and other products, and financial support
7for his political campaigns. As Andrei Tsygankov, professor of international relations at
San Francisco State University, remarked:
Since 1996, Russia and Belarus have been engaged in an elaborate political dance
concerning integration in some form. While initially Lukashenko may have
believed that a “union” of the two states could provide him with a vehicle for
holding onto power, he came to realize that this was unlikely to occur (it is better to
be the ruler of a small country than a minor figure in a large one) (Lavelle, 2005).
Moreover, in an authoritarian country, policies and ideologies of the government do
not necessarily reflect opinions of the entire population. Data from independent
sociological institutions reflect a radical polarization of Belarusian society over such
crucial questions as whether Belarus should integrate with Russia or rather with Europe.
The state of media in Belarus was much different from that of Ukraine or Georgia.
The Belarusian internal electronic media were entirely controlled by the state, and
newspapers were subjected to the heaviest onslaught in the post-Soviet history of the
country. Newspaper editors often had to choose either to break a repressive regulation or
stand by a human right to distribute information. For example, in the run-up to the
presidential vote, Belarus’ Central Election Commission ruled that publishing candidates’
political platforms in independent newspapers would be regarded as direct assistance to
them, which is against the electoral code. However, state-owned newspapers, on false
pretenses, refused to publish the program of the main Lukashenka’s rival, Alaxandr
Milinkevich. So editors had to make a choice either violate the ruling or let their readers
know the platform of the opposition leader. Choosing between informing and keeping
silent sometimes is the hardest challenge for newspaper owners in an authoritarian state.
Even a minor violation of the Belarusian media laws may be regarded as a serious felony,
resulting in a publication’s closure or imprisonment of a reporter or an editor.
8For example, the Belarus’s Ministry of Information closed down the Zhoda
newspaper for publishing a cartoon of Prophet Muhammad. The caricature, which
infuriated Muslims around the world, went practically unnoticed by Belarusians. There
were no protests or even harsh remarks against the cartoon in Zhoda in Belarus’ Islamic
circles. But the government acted fast. The prosecutor-general and later the president
himself reprimanded Zhoda for inflaming religious turmoil. But was that the real reason
for harsh punishment of the newspaper?
An alternative explanation can be found not in the religious realm, but rather in
politics and the presidential race in particular. One of the candidates running for office was
Alexander Kazulin, an outspoken Social-Democratic leader who made a surprise knockout
television address, harshly attacking the incumbent. During his speech, he accused the state
media of pro-Lukashenka propaganda, tore the official state-owned newspaper Sovetskaya
Belorussia, called Lukashenka a liar, and appealed to the Bible, comparing the president to
the devil. After this appearance his poll ratings surged and awoke the sleepy society out of
its fear, apathy, and disbelief in the opposition’s strength (Volchek et al., 2006).
Apparently, Lukashenka wanted to silence Kazulin. The best way he could do it
was by closing down a newspaper that was backing the oppositional candidate. Aleksei
Karol, Zhoda’s editor, was Kazulin’s campaign aide, so by hushing the only registered
social-democratic publication in the country, the regime seriously limited Kazulin’s
abilities to get out his message.
According to Oleg Panfilov, head of the Moscow-based Center for Journalism in
Extreme Situations (CJES), Lukashenka and his government have created a situation
where campaign coverage in the Belarusian mass media benefits only the incumbent. Such
9an atmosphere has been systematically built during Lukashenka’s rule, with radio stations,
newspapers, and Internet sites gradually being destroyed (IFEX, 2006). Lukashenka
successfully pushed a constitutional amendment through parliament in October 2004,
which enabled him to seek a third term as president. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized that process as undemocratic. It said
Lukashenka and senior administration officials received more than 90 percent of the pre-
election television coverage (IFEX, 2006). In such conditions when, on the one hand, the
incumbent gets all the attention of the state-run media, while on the other, all alternative
sources of information are silenced, the independent press virtually becomes the enemy of
the state, and with this label, it cannot keep out of the political agenda, and journalists
cannot remain detached.
The records of the Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) show that even
newspapers with little political news fail to avoid the repressive mechanism. They pose
danger to the regime just by being financially independent. This alone is a reason to crack
down on them. Belarusian journalists often choose to fight back. Of course, there is a
danger of overplaying here – journalism may become political public relations. Direct
advocacy for a certain political force is very widespread in Belarus, and this may be a large
step toward partisan journalism.
And yet, Belarusian independent newspapers, according to BAJ, strived to give a
wide picture of the election process and wrote about all presidential nominees. For
example, Belarusy i Rynok weekly dedicated 2.8 percent of materials to S. Gajdukievich,
20.1 percent to A. Kazulin, 33.4 percent to A. Lukashenka, and to 33.6 percent to A.
Milinkievich. Komsomolskaja Pravda v Belarusi gave 4.6 percent to S. Gajdukievich, 25.6
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percent, to A. Kazulin, 19.2 percent to A. Lukashenka, and 14.5 percent to A. Milinkievich
(BAJ, 2006). The coverage of candidates was mostly neutral. At the same time all these
newspapers, except Komsomolskaja Pravda v Belarusi, were critical of Lukashenka. The
BAJ monitoring, however, did not reveal any case of journalists’ ethics violation in the
independent press (BAJ, 2006).
A different picture was observed in the state-owned press. Zviazda newspaper
wrote nothing about S. Gajdukievich. A. Milinkievich, A. Kazulin and A. Lukashenka,
who took up 0.03 percent, 0.03 percent and 30.86 percent of its space respectively. At the
same period another daily Sovetskaya Belorussiya dedicated 0.4 percent of its space in the
materials covering the activities of all monitored subjects to S. Gajdukievich, 1.1 percent
to A. Kazulin and 1.1 percent to A. Milinkievich. A. Lukashenka took up 63.1 percent
(BAJ, 2006).
The literature demonstrates that the process of transition to democracy is a
challenge. East European countries had approximately the same starting point. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, Belarus’ economy was not worse than that of Poland. But the two
countries moved in different directions, and as a result, researchers suggest, the gap
between the two countries has been increasing very quickly.
However, the transition to democracy was not easy in the other post-Soviet
countries. Many are still ruled by quasi-dictators. Russia, itself, during the presidency of
Putin, has survived an onslaught against the independent electronic media. As history
shows, free media can play an important role in the process of democratization. Recently,
Ukraine and Georgia saw a revolutionary change. In both countries, media played a crucial
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role in the victory of democratic forces over the authoritarian regimes of Kuchma and
Shivarnadze.
The situation with freedom of expression in Belarus is currently worse than in
Ukraine, Georgia, or even Russia. And in 2006, when presidential elections were held, it
became a time of ordeal for both democratic forces and independent media. Proceeding to
a qualitative study of the role of independent media in Belarus’s recent presidential
elections is a challenging, interesting, and difficult undertaking. “Difficult” is the word
used by many researchers of media in Eastern Europe. Most of the published works
explore previously written literature and do not offer empirical research of their own.




The majority of post-communist states are not devoid of media denoted in this
thesis as independent. Sometimes they are termed as “free media.” Some authors use more
circumspect wording describing the media in the region – post-Soviet, post-Communist,
non-governmental, private, or transition media. Grankina (2004) termed them quality press
as opposed to mass press. Maisenya (1997) suggested calling non-state newspapers
“opposition press.” In Belarus, another widely used term is “democratic press” or “pro-
democratic press.”
Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm pinpointed the six duties
appointed to the media in light of the view of the press as the “Fourth Estate:”
(1) Serving the political system by providing information, discussion, and
debate on public affairs;
(2) Enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government;
(3) Safeguarding the rights of the individual by serving as a watchdog
against government;
(4) Servicing the economic system, primarily by bringing together the
buyers and sellers of goods and services through the medium of advertising;
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(5) Providing entertainment;
(6) Maintaining its own financial self-sufficiency so as to be free from the
pressures of special interests (p. 74).
The theories of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, although considered outdated
(Merrill & Nerone, 2002), delineate the duties of an independent newspaper, which recur
in more recent definitions of the term. Wang (1994, p. 217) defined an independent
newspaper as a news organization not controlled financially and editorially by the
government or any organization or individual that makes its own editorial policy in
accordance with professional standards. Yet he argued that no newspaper is ever
completely independent from outside control. Even in democratic countries where freedom
of the press is guaranteed by a constitution and protected by the courts, newspapers are
subjected to various kinds of control, such as legal constraints concerning libel and
government secrecy; and government news management through press conferences, press
releases, and leaks. In addition, newspapers may also be subjected to economic pressure
from advertisers and interest groups, to internal pressure such as deadlines, and to the
implicit control of news conventions such as, in the West, an emphasis upon the negative
and the unexpected (Wang, 1994). Martin, in his study of the role of mass media in Africa,
further refined the definition of independent press by adding two roles it should play in an
authoritarian society: to speak out freely and fearlessly about concrete conditions in their
own and other states; and at the same time to be an instrument for informing and
mobilizing people about their rights and obligations (Martin, 1992).
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Analyzing the First Amendment, Emerson (1963) argued that freedom of
expression in a society was essential to citizens' participation in government decision
making. Ferguson (1998) wrote:
Not only does the extent to which citizens and the media are allowed freedom of
expression predict whether outlets are available to challenge organizations, but the
degree of expression permitted impacts many aspects of a society’s culture.
Organizations in societies where the broadcast media are state-controlled, such as
in India, rarely face threats from radio and television. These media are government
propaganda tools, advancing educational and developmental goals.
Coverage of politics and public issues leaves little attention for consideration of
organizational actions and the question of their social responsibility (Ferguson, 1998;
Sriramesh, 1992). The degree of freedom of expression allowed in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union has been a significant factor in the speed of these nations' transitions
to democratic systems, while at the same time it has been largely dependent upon their
culture and the history of Soviet media (Ferguson, 1998).
There is very little in academic works on how the concept of an independent press
can be operationalized, taking into consideration a scholarly disagreement about the levels
of freedom the press enjoys in the former Soviet states and a plentiful discourse on what
constitutes an independent press. The annual reports produced by Freedom House and
Reporters Without Borders offer general analyses of different countries’ media systems.
But neither of them reveals a clear and employable strategy for evaluating the level of
independence of a certain medium. And yet, these sources are most widely cited by
scholars studying independent press from a global perspective (Esser, & Pfetsch, 2004;
Martin & Hiebert, 1990).
Also unclear is how to generalize about the diverse media in Eastern European
countries where traditional concepts and theories come into juxtaposition with one another.
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So Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s division of the world into four distinct groups of
theories – authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and Soviet communist
(Stevenson, 1994) – are considered to be outdated after the collapse of the Soviet empire
and even more so after the wave of “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, and
political changes in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova (for example, see criticism in Merrill &
Nerone, 2002).
Hatchen’s (1992) division of the world media into five concepts – western,
development, revolutionary, authoritarian, and communism – are similarly questioned. For
example, it is unclear whether the independent media in Belarus should be categorized as
revolutionary, since they are funded from abroad and support policy change, or they should
fall under the authoritarian concept, which describes the traditional autocratic media
system but fails to conceptualize the presence of the independent press in it; or they might
be considered part of the development concept, e.g., this assertion is implied by Silitski
(2006) who argued that the division between some former Soviet states and the Third
World was lost. Other scholars (Dynko, 2006; Bulhakau, 2006) concurred when Belarus
had joined the Un-aligned Nations Union.
3.2. Public (Civic) Journalism vs. Citizen Journalism
The significance of the survival of independent newspapers and newspaper
journalism in general has ardently been argued by Merritt, (1997) the father of public
journalism, or civic journalism as it is sometimes referred to. The concept of public
journalism as opposed to citizen journalism is instrumental to this research, so these terms
need to be clearly defined. The former has grown into a movement attempting to address
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issues of “media degradation” in the United States and falling interest in public life
(McGregor et al, 2000). According to “The Roots of Civic Journalism” by David K. Perry,
the practitioners of civic journalism – who saw the movement's most dramatic growth in
the early 1990’s – have always adhered to the following basic tenets: (a) attempting to
situate newspapers and journalists as active participants in community life, rather than as
detached spectators; (b) making a newspaper a forum for discussion of community issues;
(c) favoring the issues, events, and problems important to ordinary people; (d) considering
public opinion through the process of discussion and debate among members of a
community; and (e) attempting to use journalism to enhance social capital (Perry, 2003).
Likewise, independent newspapers in authoritarian countries, e.g., Belarus, serve as
community and public heralds, not avoiding hot issues but rather attempting to encourage
public participation in political life and civil society.
As noted at the Web site of the Pew Center for Civic Journalism, public journalism
is both a philosophy and a set of values supported by some evolving techniques to reflect
both of those in journalism. At its heart is a belief that journalism has an obligation to
public life – an obligation that goes beyond just telling the news or reporting facts. The
way journalism operates affects the way public life goes. Journalism can help empower a
community or it can help disable it (Pew, 2006).
The civic journalism movement has risen as an attempt to abandon the notion that
journalists and their audiences are spectators in political and social processes. The civic
journalism movement seeks to treat readers and community members as participants.
Maybe, that is why civic journalism is sometimes confused with citizen journalism. The
17
key difference is that the former is practiced by professional journalists, whereas the latter
is a prerogative of ordinary citizens.
Citizen journalism, also known as “participatory journalism,” is the act of citizens
“playing an active role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating
news and information” according to the seminal report “We Media: How Audiences are
Shaping the Future of News and Information” by Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis. They
say, “The intent of this participation is to provide independent, reliable, accurate, wide-
ranging and relevant information that a democracy requires” (Bowman & Willis, 2003).
Indeed, the “blogosphere” (all blogs as a community or social network) is now a major
influence on the political culture, as pretty much everyone who has a computer and
Internet access can publish his or her views (Cox, 2006). Citizen or participatory
journalism generally falls into these broad categories: (a) audience participation at
mainstream news outlets; (b) independent news and information Web sites; (c) full-fledged
participatory news sites; (d) collaborative and contributory media sites; (e) other kinds of
"thin media;" and (f) personal broadcasting sites. Other examples of citizen journalism
emerge all the time. And some of the categories listed above overlap with one another
(Lasica, 2003).
In Belarus, the upsurge of citizen journalism occurred in 2006 when blogs partially
undertook the functions of professional news Web sites and print media. Belarus, a country
with the population of about 10 million, has 17,521 blogs on Livejournal.com1 alone and
ranks as the 13th nation with the most Livejournal users (Livejournal, 2007). Meanwhile, in
spite of the new possibilities opened up by online tools and technologies and the growing
1 Livejournal (often abbreviated LJ) is a virtual community where Internet users can keep a blog, journal, or
diary.
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competition from bloggers, Belarusian online media seem to have based their strategies on
traditional journalism techniques. A survey of Belarusian media online conducted by e-
belarus.ORG in 2006 revealed that the number and quality of Belarusian media online
initiatives showed them to be in the period of infancy. The overwhelming majority of them
fell within the category of the news sites with very limited editorial news and some form of
participatory communication (E-Belarus.ORG, 2007).
1.3. The Role of Media in “Color” Revolutions
There has been growing scholarly attention to the transformations in Eurasian
countries that occurred in recent years and were commonly denoted as “color” revolutions.
The majority of the available literature, however, explores these phenomena from the
perspective of political science, sociology, and economics; significantly less research has
been done in the area of mass communication. Koplatadze (2004) and Sulkhanishvili
(2004) at the Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University,
defended their theses on topics related to Georgia’s Revolution of Roses and the way it
was framed by the media. Baysha & Hallahan (2004) conducted a similar study on media
framing of the Ukrainian political crisis at the turn of the new millennium, which resulted
in the Orange revolution. A much richer scholarship is available on the framing of the
downfall of Milosevic in Serbia and NATO’s military campaign in the region (Auerbach &
Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Berinsky & Kinder, 2006; Cooper, 2002; Woodward, 1995).
The literature on the revolutionary changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Serbia and the
role of media in these processes provide a substantial comparative grounding for research
on the failed Belarusian revolution. Some parallels can also be drawn from the works on
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failing media system in Russia and the pre-Yushchenko period in Ukraine. Znatkevich, a
graduate of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of North
Carolina in Chapel Hill, explored the transformations of Russian media after communism.
The author conducted a historical analysis of the media from the years of perestroika to the
mid 1990s. In the final chapter of his work, Znatkevich looked at the most recent
developments and outlined the challenges, perspectives, and dangers of Russian media.
The author noted that mass media had become much freer in Russia after the collapse of
"the empire of evil," but he predicted that there would be a set-back (Znatkevich, 1999).
Elisabeth Wächter expressed similar concerns in her Master’s thesis, “Truth and
Politics – the Mass Media in Independent Ukraine 1991 – 2001,” showing parallels with
the current Belarusian situation. While generally historical in methodology, this paper
nonetheless included events as recent as March 2001 (Wächter, 2001). The author
remarked that the research problem
did not lend itself well to original research in the form of, for instance,
questionnaires, focus groups or content analysis. However, this approach seems
justified for two reasons: firstly, there is to date no authoritative work on the mass
media in independent Ukraine available in any language. It therefore seems that the
first task must be to collect the available (published) data and structure them in a
meaningful theoretical concept (Wächter, 2001).
However, works on the Belarusian media system and, especially, the most recent
event – the failed “denim” revolution” – are much less numerous. Karp (2006) sketched
out Lukashenka’s policy toward the media: (1) the complete subordination of the official
media, (2) a restrictive policy toward independent media, (3) television - Lukashenka's
instrument, and (4) Lukashenka's struggle against the Russian media. The more the state
controls information, the narrower range of information people can access. They are
20
presented mostly with news and opinions reflecting specific interests. Censorship strives to
block any signs of criticism or critical thinking (Vutsans, 1998).
Framing theory has animated Prekiavicius’ study of the way Sovetskaya Belorussia,
the main official newspaper in Belarus, framed various political issues for the benefit of
the government. Methodologically, Prekiavicius used textual narrative analysis
categorizing media frames in “the voice of the regime” (Prekiavicius, 2005). More
recently, Usau (2006) conducted a similar analysis exploring manipulative propaganda
methods employed by the governmental journal Planeta. The qualitative study offered a
schematic representation of the frames used by the journal to cover international events,
especially foreign pressures on the Belarusian regime. The findings suggested that the
Belarusian opposition was presented as (a) being directly financed by the United States and
serving American interests; (b) a satellite of Polish enemies; and (c) directly connected
with international and Chechen terrorism (Usau, 2006).
Recently, the Polish Center for Eastern Studies conducted a qualitative study of
Belarus’ political, social, and economic situation. A group of Polish scholars from the
Center, Rafał Sadowski, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, and Iwona Winiewska (2005),
made a series of trips across Belarus to conduct in-depth interviews with representatives of
Belarusian non-profit organizations, independent media, Polish minority groups, and
priests of Catholic congregations. The researchers used nonprobability purposive samples,
including the snowball technique. In regional centers, Polish scholars contacted directors
of local pro-democratic nonprofits and resource centers and asked whom they would
recommend for an interview. The content of Belarus’ state-owned and independent media
was monitored, newspaper staffers were interviewed, and scholarly literature published by
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Belarusian think tanks was examined. The results constituted a detailed case study of the
Belarusian modern situation.
The authors devoted several sections to Belarus’ media sector and presented a
descriptive overview of the problems Belarusian independent newspapers faced with
reporters’ and editors’ insights on the quasi-legal state of the unregistered underground
press. One of the contributors, Steven Eke, wrote that President Lukashenka was
unambiguous in his characterizations of the non-state media. He has referred to them as
“fascist,” while calling on the state media “to reveal the real goals” of the political
opposition (in Lewis, 2002, pp. 89-101).
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
4.1. Case Study Method
Using a case study approach (Stake, 1995), this Master’s thesis explores the demise
of the traditional press and the emergence of new alternative sources of information that
tried to substitute for the silenced traditional media in Belarus during the period of the
2006 Presidential election campaign. This period started in October 2005, at the Congress
of Democratic Forces, when the opposition chose Alaksandr Milinkevich to challenge the
incumbent, and ended on March 25, 2006, when post-electoral protests were violently
dispersed by riot police and another opposition candidate, Aleksander Kozulin, was
arrested and consequently sentenced to five and a half years in prison (Chavusau, 2006;
Dynko, 2006; Silitski, 2006).
Case studies are bound by time and activity, and researchers collect detailed
information using a variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time
(Stake, 1995; see also Creswell, 2003). Seeger wrote (1994, p.10) that a case study was “a
story of a problem” (see also Hoag, Brickley & Cawley, 2001). A key strength of the case
study method involves using multiple sources and techniques in the data-gathering process.
The researcher determines in advance what evidence to gather and what analysis
techniques to use with the data to answer the research questions. Data gathered is normally
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largely qualitative, but it may also be quantitative. Tools to collect data can include
surveys, interviews, documentation review, observation, and even the collection of
physical artifacts (Soy, 2006, see also Eisenhardt, 1989; Hamel, 1993; Stake, 1995). 
This Master’s thesis is based primarily on archival media available online or
recorded by me during the events. The analyzed materials included review of secondary
literature, primary documents, video and audio recordings, as well as periodical
publications and reports by related organizations, e.g., the Belarusian Association of
Journalists, the Pontis Foundation, Reporters Without Borders, and the Independent
Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies.
Primary Sources
Initially, I searched for primary sources by studying the entries in the media
sections of the two biggest Belarusian web catalogs. The search revealed that, during the
electoral period, the oldest Belarusian web catalog, Akavita, contained links to 150
newspaper sites, 69 news Internet media, 19 radio stations, and 19 television channels. The
biggest selection of media links was available at the Tut.by portal: 267 print media outlets,
159 electronic media, 59 television sites, 199 analytical sites, 89 publishing houses, and 46
radio-related sites. Most of these Web sites have turned out to be irrelevant for the
analysis, as they contained no news about media developments in the country. However,
the initial stage of the examination has allowed me to make a list of both traditional
Belarusian media available online and purely Web projects. The Tut.by and Akavita Web
catalogs also enabled me to do keyword searches within the categories I was interested in.
The sites of television channels, radio stations, and publishing houses were eliminated
from the analysis. I focused on the print media and analytical Web sites. I also had to
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narrow the print media list because not all the sites were appropriate for analysis, as many
of them did not cover general political events, only entertainment news. Many
economically independent news sources refrained from covering current events or, if they
did, never allowed themselves any criticism of the current government. For my research, it
was necessary to draw a line between what was independent and what was not. For
purposes of this research independent media are defined as the information outlets that
offer political news, many-sided commentaries, and opinions and are economically and
politically nonaffiliated with the state.
The unofficial Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) keeps track of the
information environment of Belarus, so I used its count of independent news sources in the
country. According to a BAJ report, there were 20 independent registered newspapers in
Belarus in 2004. Of this list, I studied six major national newspapers. Independent
newspapers Nasha Niva and Delovaya Gazeta have their PDF versions on their websites.
All PDF materials were downloaded for further analysis. Small, independent online
regional media that do not offer national news were disregarded. The selected publications
were searched for media-related content via a ByMedia database and also by keyword
searches on their Web sites.
Unlike the independent media, Belarusian state-owned media are much more
diverse and numerous. Many newspapers have a regional scope and are not represented
online. Some ignore political topics and concentrate on some professional themes, e.g.
Nastaunickaja Hazeta focuses on educational problems and Glavniy Buchgalter on
bookkeeping. For convenience, I analyzed the Web content of the three major official
newspapers available online – Sovetskaya Belarusia (the biggest Belarusian newspaper),
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Respublika, and Zvyazda. The Belarus’ state-owned electronic media were not analyzed.
However, I followed and downloaded for further analysis the following analytical
programs of the Belarusian Television Channel One: “In Focus” and “Hard Talk,” which
summarized the official viewpoint and had the biggest ratings among Belarusian viewers.
Regarding foreign media, I scrutinized only those news sources that targeted
Belarusian audiences. Relevant programming of the following radio stations with
Belarusian services was routinely analyzed: Radio Liberty, Radio Polonia, Radio Sweden,
European Radio for Belarus, and DeutcheWelle. Some of them offered analytical
programming and panel discussions with prominent Belarusian journalists and political
analysts. Some of the discourse presented in these panels is relevant to the topic of the
thesis and is cited here.
The Internet played a major role in 2006 elections, and Web logs, especially
Livejournal diaries, competed with Web sites of traditional media in numbers of visitors,
live updates from street rallies, speed, and sometimes even quality of information. In some
cases, bloggers “scooped” big traditional news sources in covering the elections. For this
study, I daily checked and archived for further referencing all major – according to
Akavita2 statistical data – Belarusian political and general-agenda blogs during the
electoral period. I have compiled a comprehensive Livejournal blogroll, e.i., the list of
daily visited and archived blogs, and followed their activities during the entire electoral
period.
Secondary Sources
I also used the reports by research institutions and non-profit organizations
exploring Belarusian socio-economic and political situation from within or without the
2 Akavita – Belarusian Internet statistics service and online catalog.
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country. A significant array of scholarship came from the Belarusian Association of
Journalists, the Pontis Foundation, Reporters Without Borders, the Independent Institute of
Socio-Economic and Political Studies, the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the Belarusian
Assembly of Pro-Democratic Organizations, and others. I also used datasets of Belarus’
electoral observation organization “Partnership,” which organized the poll watch; the
Belarusian Journalists’ Association, especially relating to the choice of media sources for
my study; and Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, which
conducted quantitative research during the campaign period. The scope of literature on
media developments in the country, however, is much more limited than that on the
political implications of the elections.
4.2. Limitations
Because I consider this Master’s thesis first and foremost an analytical chronicle,
one of my primary goals has been to present a coherent and readable narrative that tells the
story of the media transformations in Belarus during the 2006 election campaign. While, as
discussed in the literature review, a great deal of the documentation allows me to piece
together the story of the Belarusian failed “Denim” revolution and the role of media in it,
there is still much that remains a mystery and likely will not become known by the public
until after the downfall of Lukashenka. Belarus remains an underresearched country in
Europe primarily due to its isolationistic policies. Independent research institutions are
faced with many serious problems in Belarus. Several years back, the International
Research & Exchanges Board, the Soros Foundation, and the Independent Institute of
Socio-Economic and Political Studies were forced by the Belarusian government to close
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their offices in Belarus, but some of them continue to function either from abroad or
covertly within the country, providing some insight into the Belarusian conundrum.
4.3. What I Bring to the Study
Qualitative researchers traditionally find the worldview and experiences of the
researcher to be of particular importance in evaluating the validity of a study’s results
(Bischa, 2001). In this section, I disclose some of my life experiences that might color my
interpretations of data on freedom of expression in contemporary Belarus and also helped
me ground the study in my own familiarity with the Belarusian culture and the
contemporary political scene.
In addition to being a citizen of Belarus, I have been part of Belarus’ independent
media and third sector3 for the past ten years. As a high school student, I joined the staff of
an independent weekly, Volnaje Hlybokaje (Free Hlybokaje), and worked there in multiple
positions. Having entered Polatsk State University, I started a newspaper of my own,
Conspect, the mission of which was to freely and independently cover the students’ life in
Navapolatsk and the country. I was also elected chairman of the university’s branch of
Zadzinocannie Bielaruskich Studentau (the Belarusian Student Association), the oldest
pro-democratic youth nonprofit in Belarus. After graduation, I continued my work in
Volnaje Hlybokaje in the position of a deputy editor and cooperated with other national
media outlets, such as Nasha Niva and ARCHE. As for nonprofit affiliation, I worked in
the resource centers “Sumiezza” and “Barmica,” and was an elected representative to the
Workgroup of the Assembly of Belarusian Nongovernmental Organizations in Minsk. I
3 Non-profit organizations.
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was also a cofounder of a network of active youth, New Stream, and the head of the
Partnership’s independent electoral observation mission in northwest Belarus.
I spent a lot of time engaged in international projects and traveled to Sweden,
Germany, Poland, Latvia, Ukraine, and other countries. One of my recent strong
impressions was “the Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. There I was a part of an ENEMO
electoral observation mission. This experience has contributed to my better understanding
of the political landscape in the region and its electoral laws and media systems.
The cultural aspect of the study and my understanding of the current situation is
very important. I had to deal with texts in Belarusian and Russian, and my fluency in both
languages was essential in this research. Qualitative research is often based on the study of
language and meaning that resides in the dialectical process between the text and the
reader, which takes place in a particular social and historical context (Curtin, 1995; Hil,
1979). My background in Belarusian independent journalism, and my experience in
election monitoring and civil society initiatives may color this study with my opinions and
insights. However, my cognizance of the situation and familiarity with journalists and civil
activists in Belarus provides information that may be hidden to outside researchers.
CHAPTER V
THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTACK ON THE INDEPENDENT PRESS
5.1. The State vs. the Press
The Belarusian Constitution proclaims the freedom of the press. In practice,
criticism of the president as the supreme authority of the nation often is a prelude to a
crack-down. This applies to all media – both printed and electronic. The opposition claims
that since the top management of the Belarusian Television and Radio Company is
appointed by the president, it is totally subordinated to him. Political opposition therefore
is denied any access to the government-owned media (Maximenkov, 2007). This chapter
addresses how the Belarusian traditional media struggled for survival during the 2006
Belarusian Presidential campaign and examines the closure of some independent
newspapers, the distribution ban imposed on others, and the newspapers’ struggle to reach
their audiences in these extreme conditions.
The history of the ongoing battle between the Belarusian regime and the
independent media can be traced back to the beginning of Lukashenka’s presidency. Some
authors note that tensions between the government and the press existed during the earliest
years of Belarusian independence (Feduta, 2005; Karp, 2007). The state-controlled media
adhered to the official line of the governing elite, and the first independent publications
and radio stations that began to appear in Belarus at the beginning of the 1990s met with
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repressive measures by the government of Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich (Karp,
2007).The main reason for this is that, unlike in Lithuania or Poland, a change in the
Belarusian ruling elites did not occur with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pro-
democratic Belarusian Popular Front failed to come to power, while the former
Communists controlling the parliament were reluctant to rise to the challenges of
democracy and to abandon the privileges they enjoyed (Lindner, 2002). In this situation,
the early independent newspapers – Svaboda, Nasha Niva, Pahonia, and others –
adamantly criticized the government and the Supreme Council (the Parliament) and
became the agents of change (Jakubowicz, 1995), but the state-owned press of the pre-
Lukashenka period also allowed itself to openly challenge the government’s fallacies and
policy failures (Manaev, 1995).
During the first presidential elections in 1994, the Belarus media faced increased
censorship from Prime Minister Kebich’s administration which, in an attempt to silence
critical voices during the campaign, had taken radio programs off the air and prevented
independent newspapers from printing. Kebich was the main presidential hopeful of the
ruling elite, and pollsters did not project Lukashenka would make it into the run-off. Some
editors hoped that should anti-corruptionist Lukashenka come to power, government
attacks on the media would be consigned to the past (Human Rights Watch, 1997).
When Lukashenka won the 1994 Election, his first days in office were quite
peaceful. Lukashenka said at his first press conference, “From now on the press would be
able to feel free” (Klaskouski, 2006). Both the opposition and most of the press offered a
grace period to the newly elected first president of the country. However, the first major
scandal ended in one instant the illusion of peaceful coexistence of the press and the new
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government. In December 1994, Syarhey Antonchyk, an oppositional parliamentarian,
delivered an anticorruption report to the Supreme Council that implicated President
Lukashenka and members of his government. At that time, state-run newspapers would
regularly publish the important documents issued by Supreme Council, but the president’s
office was so worried about the public’s perception of Antonchyk’s report that Alexander
Feduta, the presidential press secretary, gathered the editors of major publications and
asked them directly not to publish the report. Peculiarly enough, most of the editors
decided to disobey the request, and the infamous report had to appear in print the next
morning. The authorities, however, could not allow this to happen, and a phone-call order
was given to the state-owned publishing house not to publish Antonchyk’s report. The next
morning all major newspapers appeared with blank spots and empty pages where the
article was supposed to be. Soon afterwards, Feduta, discontent with the government’s
actions against the press, resigned, took the blame for this incident, and covered for the
president. The recalcitrant editors of state-owned print media who allowed themselves to
challenge the president were dismissed and replaced with more subservient employees
(Feduta, 2005; Hawkes, 1999). This was the turning point when many Belarusians and
international observers understood that the age of partial freedom of the press in Belarus
was over and nothing promising should be expected from the Lukashenka’s government.
From 1994 onwards, the independent Belarusian media have faced unrelenting
pressure to comply with the official version of events and to abstain from critical reporting.
As the political climate became increasingly authoritarian, many of the new media laws
enacted during the presidency of Lukashenka were unfavorable to mass media. The
required registration of mass media enables the government to prevent the establishment of
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undesirable sources of alternative information. In order to legally publish a newspaper, an
editorial board must have a legally registered office. It can be acquired by signing the order
of agreement with the local administration. However, over the past few years, unexplained
refusals have been given to every request to launch a newspaper. In 2004, local
government authorities refused to provide legal addresses to the editorial board of such
newspapers as Afisha (Billboard), Novaya Gazeta Smorgoni (New Newspaper of
Smarhon), Sobstvennyi Kommentariy (Own Commentary), and Volny Horad (Free Town)
(Viasna, 2004).
In April 1998, a memorandum entitled “On Strengthening Countermeasures
[Against] Articles in the Opposition Press,” marked “for official use” and signed by B.N.
Bolozhinski, an officer from the president’s office, was leaked to the press in Minsk. The
memorandum outlined three main points of action to counter antigovernment media
coverage: banning the passing of official documents by the government and state organs to
non-state media; banning commentary by state officials on official documents to the
“opposition mass-media;” and forbidding state enterprises from placing advertisements in
“opposition newspapers,” which denies these newspapers important revenue (Hawkes,
1999).
The state also refined the legislative ways to close an unwanted media outlet. In
2003, the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus amended the national Press
Law, making it possible to lawfully close a media organization if it received three
warnings from the ministry in one year. A warning could be issued on such a minor matter
as, for example, a failure to inform the ministry about changes in circulation or number of
issues per week. This is exactly what happened to western Belarus-based independent
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Mestnaja Gazeta (Local Newspaper) in the spring of 2004. However, in another similar
situation, when a state-supported newspaper of the same region, Nash Chas (Our Time),
failed to report changes in its publishing schedule and left its datelines unaltered, the
ministry refrained from issuing any warning and Nash Chas remained clear of any
wrongdoing (Ivashin, 2005).
Due to these and other measures, the work of independent reporters was
substantially complicated. A minor violation of the repressive laws could result in an
official warning from the State Press Committee, which acted as the government's censor
(CPJ, 1999). An example of such measures against an independent newspaper Svaboda is
presented in the following section.
5.2. Svaboda Case: The First Closed Newspaper
Svaboda, the oldest Belarusian independent newspaper and the most relentless
critic of the government, was one of the few publications criticizing the president from his
first days in office. It was also the most popular independent newspaper in the country. In
November 1997, it became the first newspaper to be closed for political reasons. The
Supreme Economic Court declared that two of Svaboda's articles threatened “to incite
discord both in society and between the citizens and the government” (Bykowski, 1998).
Kozyr (1998) clarified:
The November 19 warnings relate to two articles published in Svaboda earlier in
November. One article, entitled “Impeachment - The Second Attempt,” drew
parallels between Belarus today and 1937; the other, entitled “Belarus -
Remembrance Day,” accused the president of incompetence and criminal activity.
In accordance with the Law on the Press, publications that receive “multiple”
warnings are in danger of closure. In this instance, the Higher Economic Court
ruled Svaboda to be in breach of Article 5 of the law and annulled its registration,
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thereby closing the newspaper. The two articles, and the three articles which
previously drew warnings, were within the internationally accepted boundaries of
free speech. Further, the closure of Svaboda for the expression of such opinions
constitutes a clear violation of domestic and international instruments, such as
Articles 33 (3) and 34 (1) of the Constitution of Belarus, Article 3 of the Law on
the Press and other Mass Media, Article 8 of the Russia-Belarus Union Charter, and
Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Svaboda was shut down as a warning to other independent newspapers that every
publication can be closed this way (Bykowski, 1998). In February 1997, somebody shot in
the window of the house of Ihar Germyanchuk, editor-in-chief of Svaboda. The case was
not solved by the police (Dubina, 1998). But neither intimidation nor direct pressure from
the authorities stopped him and the newspaper’s staff. The decision was made to continue
publishing and soon the newspaper returned to newsstands under a new name, Naviny. But
the problems did not stop after the name change, because the editors chose not to mitigate
their criticism of the government.
Naviny received a warning from the State Committee on the Press on January 23,
1998, for reprinting the Svaboda logo on the front page (Kozyr, 1998). And in the night of
November 1, 1998, the newspaper’s office was robbed. The most interesting fact in this
robbery is that thieves took away just hard disk drives, leaving expensive monitors. The
damage was estimated at $3,000, but the worst of it was the loss of a data base that had
been created throughout the eight-year existence of the newspaper (Dubina, 1998).
On May 26, 1998, Naviny received a second warning for a satirical article on the
Belarusian militia. The final straw came when Naviny published an article describing how
State Security Secretary Viktar Sheyman had built a luxury house for his parents.
Unfortunately for Naviny, the picture accompanying the article was of the wrong house. A
libel suit followed, and a court ordered the newspaper to 15 billion Belarusian rubles
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($52,000) in damages. Naviny could not pay, and the paper has closed down once again.
Occasional issues of Naviny have appeared since, samizdat-style,4 and yet another
incarnation of the paper, Nasha Svaboda, was registered and appeared early in 2000
(Jarvis, 1999). In August 2002, the independent newspaper was convicted of libeling the
chairman of the State Control Committee and fined 100 million Belarusian rubles
($55,000). Unable to pay, the publication was forced to close (CPJ, 2002).
In 2005, the first editor-in-chief of Svaboda, Siarhiej Dubaviec, attempted to
resurrect the publication in a bulletin-size format. The effort was short-lived. Svaboda,
however, now exists online, as a Web project. Its newest Web reincarnation is based on
WordPress, a content management system used as a software solution for bloggers.
Svaboda’s case is not unique. Similar strategies have been used against other independent
publications, such as Svobodnyje Novosti, which, after closure, was forced to change its
name to Svobodnyje Novosti Plus.
5.3. Toward the Denim Revolution
Various international and domestic institutions have noted that press freedom
situation was gradually worsening in Belarus over the years of Lukashenka’s rule
(including the Belarusian Association of Journalists, the U.S. State Department, the Pontis
Foundation, The East European Democratic Center, and others). Belarus’s ranking in the
press freedom indices of both Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House has dropped
continuously. In the Freedom House index, Belarus fell from the 66th position it occupied
4 Samizdat (Russian: , Polish: Bibuła or drugi obieg) was the clandestine copying and distribution
of government-suppressed literature or other media in Soviet-bloc countries.
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in 1994, when Lukashenka came to power, to 86th place in 2005, when the regime’s fear of
a “color revolution” was paramount.
The victory of the pro-democracy forces in Ukraine, similar events in Georgia, and
later peaceful changes of governments in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have been commonly
referred to as the wave of “color revolutions” (Guillory, 2006). In Belarus, the state-run
media practically ignored these events or framed them in a negative light, whereas the
independent media provided extensive coverage of the victorious protests in the
neighboring countries. Some Belarusian independent news Web sites (for instance,
Charter97.org and Sumiezza.org) introduced orange elements to their design to support the
revolution in Ukraine.
The successful peaceful transitions to democracy in Ukraine and Georgia impressed
opposition members, journalists, and observers from Belarus who followed the events in
these former Soviet countries with great interest (Guillory, 2006). Hundreds of my
compatriots, including myself, visited Kiev during the 2004 Presidential Election.
Watching hundreds of thousands on Maidan (Kiev’s central square) was one of the most
unforgettable experiences in my life. The Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of
Ottawa, Dominique Arel (2005), called the Orange Revolution the most momentous
political event in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution unearthed a vibrant civil society that few scholars and analysts believed had
existed. Massive popular demonstrations in Kyiv were sparked when authorities
proclaimed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych the winner of the November 2004
presidential runoff, despite exit-poll reports of a clear lead for opposition candidate Viktor
Yushchenko (Kuzio, 2005).
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Belarusian opposition leaders, unlike skeptical analysts, were optimistic sparked
with optimism thinking that the wave of change would reach Belarus (Guillory, 2006). In
January 2004, the civic initiative Five Plus was created. It was a coalition of six pro-
democratic parties (Belarusian Green Party, Belarusian Labour Party, Belarusian Social-
Democratic Gromada, United Civil Party, Belarusian National Front, and Party of
Communists of Belarus), leading non-governmental organizations, and independent labor
unions. A common strategy for the coming parliamentary elections was adopted, as well as
a common list of candidates and a common program (Five Steps to a Better Life) (SILBA,
2005). In December, Five Plus agreed with another oppositional group, European
Coalition, to join forces during the pivotal 2006 presidential campaign.
In April and May 2005, the united democratic forces held conferences in Minsk
and the regions. The representatives of the democratic forces defined names of four
challengers for the role of a single candidate. In June-August 2005, delegates for the
Congress of the Democratic Forces of Belarus were elected at regional and city meetings
of democratic organizations. It was decided that participation in the Congress also would
be open to democratic members of the last two convocations of the Supreme Soviet of
Belarus, candidates of the parliamentary elections to the House of Representatives in 2004
from Five plus and the European Coalition, representatives of the pro-democratic NGOs,
democratic members of local councils, editors-in-chief of independent media, and some
other influential Belarusian politicians and public opinion leaders (SILBA, 2005).
On October 3, 2005, a regional leader with a strong background in the nonprofit
sector and the academe, Alaxandr Milinkevich, was chosen to run for president as a sole
contender from the Belarusian pro-democratic forces. He won 399 votes, beating by eight
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votes his main challenger, Anatol Lyabedzka, who collected 391 votes. The participants of
the Congress represented the majority of oppositional parties and public associations of
Belarus. They signed an agreement that all forces represented at the Congress would
support the chosen candidate (BHTimes, 2005).
Milinkevich, however, was not the only one who was to challenge the incumbent.
Alexander Kozulin, the former Rector of the Belarusian State University, on April 10,
2005, was elected as the chairman of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party Hramada.
The same year, Kozulin became a founder and coordinator of a nation-wide social
movement, the People's Will. According to many analysts, his fierce campaigning
invigorated the presidential race (Boraty	ski et al, 2006). An agreement between
Milinkevich and Kozulin was discussed but not reached, and the electorate had to choose
between the two oppositional contenders. The latter attracted the media’s attention for his
fierce campaigning strategy.
5.4. The Distribution Ban and the Struggle for Survival in the Pre-electoral Period
The campaign was covered extensively by the independent media. However, due to
the regime’s counter-measures, Belarusian society remained largely uninformed about the
political alternative to Lukashenka. In April, 2005, Zhanna Litvina, chairwoman of the
Belarusian Association of Journalists, predicted that the Belarusian authorities were
seeking “a total cleansing of the information sector” in the country. Yelena Raubetskaya,
chairwoman of the Fund for the Development of Regional Press, was even bleaker in her
prognosis. She said that libel suits against independent media would be followed by the
removal of major nonstate publications from state-run print shops and state-controlled
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press-distribution networks. "I am absolutely sure that by 2006, the nongovernmental press
that writes about politics will no longer exist," Raubetskaya added (Maksymiuk, 2005).
By 2005, the authorities had practically cleansed Belarus of independent
newspapers. In a single year, the Ministry of Information issued160 written warnings and
suspended 25 publications. The press had never before faced such an enormous pressure.
In August and September 2005, some independent newspapers had to reregister under new
names because in May President Lukashenka issued a decree limiting the use of the words
“national” and “Belarusian” in the names of organizations positing that only state
institutions had a right to use them. Private media outlets were not allowed to use any of
these words in their names (Maksymiuk, 2005).
The presidential decree compelled many newspapers to reregister: Belorusskaya
Delovaya Gazeta (Belarusian Business Newspaper) as BDG Delovaya Gazeta,
Natsionalnaya Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (National Economic Newspaper) as
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, Belorusskii Rynok (Belarusian Market) as Belorussy i Rynok
(Belarusians and the Market), and Belorusskaya Gazeta as Belgazeta. Many Belarusian
commentators said that the reregistation was primarily intended to confuse and disorient
the readers of independent periodicals and make it difficult for them to find their preferred
publications on newsstands or in subscription catalogs (Maksymiuk, 2005).
According to the counts of the Belarusian Association of Journalists, by 2005,
around 20 officially registered independent publications were left in the country. Most of
them were regional. The newspapers Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Niva, Zhoda, Salidarnasc,
BDG, and several regional publications were excluded from the state-owned distribution
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system, they were also forbidden to be sold by the state-owned monopoly of kiosks
(Volchek et al., 2006).
The editor of Nasha Niva, Andrei Dynko, found out about the subscription ban
from his readers. According to his words,
this is a sign that the country is now devoid of fair elections. Thus, I think this will
enfeeble the regime itself. What concerns the ban of subscription for Nasha Niva
and the regional newspapers, this is also a crime against our culture. The
newspapers published in the Belarusian language, comprise just 10 percent of all
the newspapers in the country, but they comprise 70 percent of all the banned
publications. This is an extermination of the Belarusian culture (Charter97, 2005).
The editors of independent newspapers were faced with the question of how to
respond to the onslaught on their publications. Independent periodicals chose different
methods to deal with the ban. Some, like BDG and Salidarnasc, transitioned to online
news outlets, others decided to fight to the end. Nasha Niva had to change its format from
A3 to a letter-size A4,5 a standard printer-friendly format for easy multiplication
(Khrapavitski, 2006) but increased the number of pages to 48 to compensate for the
smaller format, and mailed every issue to its subscribers via ordinary mail (NN, 2007). The
subscription fee was collected directly by the editorial staff, and more people had to be
hired to do the mass mailing. The newspaper I had worked for back in Belarus, Volnaye
Hlybokaje, was removed from the subscription catalog, as well, and chose a similar
method of distribution. The newspaper targeted the North-Western part of the country, and
in Hlybokaje, it was sold on the central market by the newspaper’s own salesman.
Other newspapers also faced the print ban imposed on them in Belarus. Narodnaya
Volya, for example, was forced to be printed at a publishing house in Smolensk, Russia.
5 Using the metric system, the base format is a sheet of paper measuring 1 m² in area (A0 paper size).
Successive paper sizes in the series A1, A2, A3, etc., are defined by halving the preceding paper size parallel
to its shorter side. The most frequently used paper size is A4 (210 × 297 mm).
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Transportation of the print run was not always successful. The authorities occasionally
seized the entire print runs of certain issues of the independent newspapers. For example,
on March 4, 2006, the police arrested 250,000 copies of Narodnaya Volya. The two
automobiles transporting the newspaper from the publishing house were stopped by the
police and escorted to Vitebsk. There the print run was confiscated for alleged violation of
the electoral code (Volchek et al., 2006).
On March 17, 2006, the police confiscated 200,000 copies of Tovarishch. The
seized issue contained coverage of the presidential campaign of opposition leader
Alaksandr Milinkevich. Like Narodnaya Volya, Tovarishch was printed in Smolensk,
Russia, because printing houses in Belarus refused to take on the politically sensitive job.
Like many other opposition newspapers, Tovarishch relied on volunteers to distribute
directly to readers since December 2, 2005, when the postal service Belpochta excluded
the newspaper from its 2006 subscription catalog, effectively barring the newspaper from
being mailed. (CPJ, 2006).
5.5. The Peak of Confrontation
Human rights abuses and political abuses ran rampant as the elections were
approached. Lukashenko criminalized criticism of his regime and banned demonstrations.
Secret police targeted opposition groups, and hundreds suffered arrests and prosecution as
a result. While Minsk had officially invited the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) election monitors, each monitor had to have an invitation from the pro-
Lukashenka Central Electoral Commission (CEC). This commission had publicly stated
that the expected number of observers (700 to 800) was excessive and that no monitors
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from Georgia, Latvia, or Lithuania would be invited. U.S. envoy to Belarus George Krol
described the odds of these elections being free and fair as “dismal” (Cohen, 2006).
The clampdown on the press, as seen from the prior chapters, had begun long
before the actual election, but the tension between the state and the independent media
reached its peak during the election week and the mass protests that followed the election.
In the week preceding the vote, four independent newspapers were forced to halt
publication. On 10 March, the Higher Economic Court temporarily suspended the
independent newspaper Zhoda following a complaint filed by the Information Ministry.
Three days later, on March 13, a printing house in Smolensk, Russia, informed the BDG
(Delovaya Gazeta) and Tovarishch newspapers that their printing contracts had been
terminated for “economic and political reasons.” Police confiscated the print run of the
Narodnaya Volya newspaper on March 14, after the newspaper was able to find another
printing house in Smolensk (IPI, 2006). The newspaper also lost its printing contract after
the incident. “When a week before the election someone refuses to print three papers, it is
clear there are political reasons," Narodnaya Volya quoted Managing Editor Svetlana
Kalinkina as saying. "The authorities [in Minsk] must have done a deal with Russian
authorities who found a way to pressure the printing house” (IFEX, 2006).
Both opposition leaders, Milinkevich and Kazulin, had no trust in the fairness of
these elections and urged their supporters to come to Minsk’s central Kastrychnitskaya
Square in order to demand a fair revote from the government and the CEC. The official
results gave the incumbent Lukashenka a convincing 82 percent victory. This result had
been widely predicted and provoked the international community’s hostile response – in
the weeks leading up to the election the main observer mission, the Organization for
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Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), prejudged both the conduct and result of the
poll, deeming it to be neither free nor fair before a vote was cast (BHHRG, 2006).
On the election night, on March 19, 2006, 10,000 to 30,000 people (estimates vary)
gathered to rally in Minsk to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the election result. In
doing so, they defied the authorities' repeated threats to classify protesters as "terrorists"
(an offence punishable by eight years of prison or even the death penalty) and their resort
to sending text-messages to reiterate the warning. In the face of dozens of buses filled with
riot police beside the square, people continued to gather for five days after the vote;
hundreds stayed overnight in freezing temperatures, and thousands turned up again to a
demonstration on March 25 (Letain, 2006). Young people set up a tent camp on
Kastrychnitskaya Square, preparing for a long standoff. Similar tactics had been employed
by the Ukrainian opposition during the Orange Revolution in 2004 (Aslund & McFaul,
2006). The Belarusian police, however, blockaded the square, arresting anyone who
attempted to bring tents, warm clothes, or even food to the protesters (McFaul et al, 2006).
Among the protesters was the editor-in-chief of Nasha Niva, Andrej Dynko, who was
arrested on March 22 when be attempted to bring food to the youth rallying days and
nights on the Kastrychnitskaya Square. Dynko was accused of "hooliganism" for allegedly
using “vulgar language” (Andrukhovich, 2006; Charter97, 2006). During his time in
prison, the journalist kept a diary. Dynko (2006) wrote:
I am writing these lines on Monday at 11 pm. With luck, these notes will reach the
office of Nasha Niva just in time to be printed. The lights are out, but the prison is
not sleeping. It is as loud as a jungle in the night. Voices and even laughter can be
heard from the cells. The sounds of the prison remind me of a summer camp for
children. During the day the prisoners play chess (with figures sculpted from
bread), "mafia", battleship, and solve crossword puzzles. When the night comes, it
is time for verbal games. Prisoners recall the riot police and guards they have met,
and tell spicy jokes about the dictator and his camarilla, state radio hosts, and
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sergeants who were gathered from all corners of the Belarusian capital to
Akrestsina prison in Minsk. "Calm down, motherf*****!" – the guards remind the
prisoners about their existence, but the buzz doesn't get any more quiet. There is a
lit bulb in a small window above the door. It gives me enough light to write.
Despite the blockade, the tent camp in Minsk held on until early March 24 when
the special forces stormed the square, arresting all the participants. That night hundreds of
people – including my best friends – were arrested. But the protests did not stop with the
dispersal of the protests on Kastrychnitskaya Square. On March 25, 20,000 to 30,000
people gathered in Janka Kupala park to continue to promote the cause of the Denim
Revolution. The protesters decided to march to the jail on Akrescina to demand freedom
for the hundreds of political prisoners who were arrested mostly during the storming of the
tent camp and awaited trials in that jail. On the way to the jail, police suddenly blocked the
demonstrators (an estimated number is 3,000 to 10,000) and started beating them up and
throwing smoke and gas grenades into the crowd. The presidential hopeful was badly
beaten up and arrested. Some people were seriously injured (Katkouski, 2006). That was
the violent ending of the Denim Revolution.
But not just ordinary protesters and politicians were detained and beaten.
According to information gathered by the Belarus Association of Journalists (BAJ),
approximately 40 journalists, about a score of them foreign, were arrested by the
authorities in Belarus from March 14 to 27. They were accused of taking part in opposition
rallies. Six of have been released since then after serving sentences of up to five days in
prison. Several others were released after a brief detention and at least three others were
sentenced to pay a fine (RWB, 2006).
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5.6. The Attacked Press Keeps on Struggling
Even after the journalists and protesters had been freed, it was obvious to every
independent journalist in Belarus that the press was still facing an ordeal. Just before its
100th anniversary, the independent Belarusian newspaper Nasha Niva was threatened with
closure. The Executive Committee of the City of Minsk ruled that the arrest of editor-in-
chief Andrej Dynko on March 22 disqualified Nasha Niva from operating as a company in
Minsk. Since January 1, 2006, the periodical had run up against a series of bureaucratic
brick walls intended to force it out of circulation. State-run distributor Bielsajuzdruk had
found various pretexts for refusing to deliver Nasha Niva; the official subscription service
also refused to handle the paper. Then, on April 10, 2006, the Belarusian Ministry of
Information notified the editors of Nasha Niva that its application for a license to distribute
via independent subscription had been refused (Eurozine, 2006; see also NN, 2006). The
newspaper is still struggling; its distribution is carried out via a mass mailing system they
succeeded to set up. The independent newspapers’ owners also attempted to address the
government to stop the confrontation. The editors of five non-state periodicals –
Narodnaya Volya, Tovarisch, BDG. Delovaya Gazeta, Borisovskie Novosti, and Vitebsky
Kuryer – wrote an open letter to Lukashenka. They were prompted by the inability since
2005 for non-state periodicals to print in Belarus. They questioned the distribution ban
through state-monopolist distribution companies, Belsayuzdruk and Belposhta (Rutkovsky,
2006).
On May 23, addressing the Belarusian House of Representatives, the head of state
said he intended to study the situation and resolve the problem. After Lukashenka’s pledge,
the editors appealed to the Ministry of Information to ameliorate the situation. However,
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the Ministry’s response was that distribution and printing of newspapers was a matter
strictly between companies and did not involve the Ministry (Rutkovsky, 2006).
Some publications also urged their readers to write official appeals to the Ministry
of Information and other administrative institutions and to demand the return of the
independent newspapers to subscription catalogs and newsstands. After the subscription
ban was imposed on Brestsky Kurier, one of the largest regional newspapers in the
country, its readers, members of nonprofits, and trade unions appealed to Belposhta to
renew the subscription. Due to the public’s demands, subscription for Brestsky Kurier was
renewed on December 15, 2006. Yet, the number of subscribers significantly dropped, and
this resulted in revenue losses for the publication (Guseynova, 2007).
5.7. What the Future Holds for Print Journalism
In an authoritarian state, when political parties are weak and civic societies are still
nascent, journalists often become heralds of an alternative vision for political development.
They also become tribunes pushing the society towards a better geopolitical choice. The
current state of Belarusian journalism resembles the times of Polish Solidarity, when
leaflets and bulletins were distributed and accurate, unbiased reporting was rare. An
assertion can be made that part of Belarus’ independent press ranks among Hachten’s
“revolutionaries,” grounded on the fact that practically all of it is funded by foreign donors.
Indeed, without financial support, Belarus would hardly have a single independent
newspaper. The regime has put them in unbearable, unfair economic conditions. Whereas a
state-run newspaper can publish a television guide for free, an independent one is obliged
to pay around $1,000 per month. All publishing houses where newspapers can be printed
47
by an offset method are state-owned. So an independent newspaper has to pay two, or even
three times, as much as a state-run publication. After the recent developments, the former
have lost their right to be printed in Belarus at all.
With a strong regime in power, which cracks down on any source of alternative
information, the underground newspapers are the only mouthpiece the opposition can use
to spread their viewpoints throughout the country. In Belarusian independent newspapers,
one would not be able to find many positives about Lukashenka’s policies, rather just as
many negative commentaries of his policies as in the state-run media on the opposition’s.
This is especially true about the biggest independent newspapers – Narodnaya Vola and
Nasha Niva.
But the difference is – and here real journalism comes into play – factual, i.e.
independent newspapers cannot afford to lie, or they will be closed for libel even on the
most far-fetched pretences imaginable. To the contrary, the state-run media, in a dictatorial
state, are not limited by any legal rules. Throughout the Lukashenka period of Belarusian
history, there have been very few cases, in which ordinary citizens or oppositional
politicians succeeded in winning libel cases brought against the official media. The
regime-owned political media are above the law, as their societal purposes are propaganda,
agitation, and control. These three functions were implemented in the totalitarian Soviet
Union. Lenin put them forward, as the purposes of the media in a communist country. And
some leaders of ex-USSR republics – for example Turknenistan, Russia, and Belarus –
certainly learned their history well.
So in Belarus’s case, the Belarusian independent press is largely partisan, biased,
and politically motivated, but the reason for it to be that way is that the state-owned press
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ignores views dissident to the ruling regime. But the Belarusian independent newspapers
still do their job, sustaining the journalistic profession in the country, no matter how hard it
may be. Meanwhile, the state-run media have lost their journalistic spark. I would rather
characterize them by Leninist notions – agitators, propagandists, and controllers. In
Belarus’ journalistic circles, even a special term was invented to differentiate them.
Independent newspapers are referred to as the sources of mass information; the state-run
press is often called “sources of mass propaganda.”
As the dictatorship was taking form after what some call the harshest and the most
fraudulent electoral campaign in Belarusian post-Soviet history, the newspapers reached
smaller and smaller audiences. Thus, the following questions arise. How to preserve
quality journalism within Belarus? How to keep the high level of political debate and the
variety of opinions, that were present on pages of the independent newspapers? How to
make the news as affordable as possible? How to reach the widest audiences? These
questions have been raised by institutions supporting the free press in Eastern Europe. And
answers are needed urgently, as the regime has practically extinguished the independent
print media from the Belarusian soil.
CHAPTER VI
EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF ALTERNATIVE MEDIA
6.1. Satellite Television and the Internet
This chapter explores the appearance of new alternative media mostly initiated by
ordinary citizens who attempted to disseminate information about the events in the country
during the electoral period. The chapter discusses the role of the Internet as a new
communication platform, the phenomenal popularity of Livejournal blogs in Belarus, and
the government’s efforts to impede the proliferation of uncensored Internet content.
During the period studied here, the information blockade in Belarus had a few
important loopholes, through which alternative information could ooze in. One was
satellite television. Unlike China or Uzbekistan, the Belarus government did not limit
ownership of satellite receivers, and the number of people who were able to watch foreign
channels was gradually increasing. However, satellite broadcasting was very expensive.
The European Union was able to fund a 30-minute program, “Window to Europe,” on
Russian independent satellite channel RTVI. It had been available to subscribers of Minsk
cable network Cosmos TV, but just before the elections, the channel was blocked “for
technical reasons.” The Belarusian authorities did not impose any restrictions on purchase
of satellite dishes, but Belarusians did not have an independent satellite channel, nor did
the majority of the population own satellite dishes. In fact, residents of smaller towns,
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where there were no cable operators, tended to buy a dish sooner than residents of the
cities where cable television was widespread. But some 20 to 40 channels included in a
package were filtered by controllers from the Ministry of Information. The downside of
relying on satellite television was its high cost for customers. RTVI was an encrypted
channel, and unless one subscribed to it and paid, one would not be able to watch it.
During the researched period, there were discussions that a new free-to-air satellite channel
should be launched, but still a potential viewer would have to buy the equipment (the
minimum cost is $100).
The most important unfiltered medium in Belarus was the Internet. Unlike satellite
television, it had already become a significant source of free information for Belarusians.
Internet use was growing rapidly in the country. According to statistics compiled by the
International Telecommunications Union, in 2004 there were 1,409,780 Internet users, i.e.
about 14 percent of the country's total population. A recent survey conducted by the
Belarusian Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Research indicated that
people aged 20-24 were the most active Internet users, and 50 percent of users were
university graduates. Some 40 percent of Internet users were government officials. The
majority of users (45.6 percent) lived in regional centers, and 22.9 percent were inhabitants
of the capital of the country (Sokolova & Doroshkevich, 2006).
One day before the elections, an anonymous user posted a comment on the most
popular Web-site in the country, Tut.by. He wrote that Belarus would be remembered in
history as a country where the Internet played a crucial role in the upheaval of the nation
against the dictatorship. He even called the recent post-election protests the “Internet
Revolution” (Anonymous, 2006).
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Indeed, most traditional media in Belarus were also available online. After
newspapers had been banned from the state-run distribution system, their Web sites
became practically the only means for journalists to reach the audiences. In fact, many
newspapers, like some of their western counterparts, had much more content online than in
their print versions. So Nasha Niva, BDG, and KP-Belarus worked in a nonstop regime on
election day, offering online coverage from Minsk’s downtown where thousands of people
came to protest the electoral fraud.
6.2. The Case of Forced Transition from Print to Online
Belarus is a country where the transition of some independent newspapers from
print to online has been taking place for the past few years, fueled by the repressive state
crackdown on censorship-free sources of information. This section illustrates how some
Belarusian newspapers had to seek new ways to reach their readers. According to
Belarusian media law, the court could ban a newspaper after two official warnings (Zakon
RB o SMI, 1995). Later the law increased the number of warnings from two to three but
made the closure proceedings easier for the state authorities (Ivashin, 2005). The
government used this law to close, among others publications, Pahonia, a major regional
newspaper from Hrodna that overtly criticized the regime. After closure, Pahonia
transformed itself into an online edition, maintaining its mission of providing censor-free
news. After its transition to online, however, the problems of Pahonia did not stop. Its
editors, Mikola Markevich and Paval Mazhejka, were sentenced to a year and a half of
“corrective labor” on charges of libeling Lukashenka in an online article. Despite
imprisonment of its journalists, Pahonia survived in an online format. Similar to Pahonia,
52
the first closed Belarusian independent newspaper, Svaboda, whose story is described in
detail in the previous chapter, transformed into a purely online project in 2005.
International attention was drawn to Belarus on May 12, 2005, when the newly
elected leadership of the Union of Poles in Belarus was declared illegitimate by the
Belarusian Ministry of Justice. A series of attacks on the Polish minority also affected an
independent newspaper of the Belarusian Poles. A state-owned printing plant, under
instructions from the government, refused to print the Polish weekly Glos znad Niemna. In
addition to this, fake issues of the newspaper were printed under the umbrella of the
Belarusian government. Repressions against its journalists followed. On August 1, 2005,
Belarusian police arrested Andrzej Pisalnik, editor-in-chief of Glos znad Niemna and a
contributor to the Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita in Schuchin. On July 6, 2005, Pisalnik
and several of his colleagues from Glos znad Niemna, as well as Andrzej Poczobut, editor-
in-chief of Magazyn Polski, and Ivan Roman, a reporter for the Solidarnasc newspaper,
were arrested by police in Grodno, while they were protesting in the city center against the
harassment of their newspapers. The printing of Glos znad Niemna in Belarus was no
longer possible; however, the newspaper is now published in Poland and transported to
Belarus. The fastest way to access news of Glos znad Niemna, however, is via the
periodical’s web site (www.glos-wschod.org) (Human Rights House, 2005).
In September 2005, Salidarnasc, a newspaper published by the Independent Trade
Union, was forced by authorities to suspend its print version, but in February 2006, the
periodical launched a regularly updated Web site and positioned itself as an Internet
newspaper. In March 2006, after a distribution ban, another major independent newspaper,
BDG, discontinued its print version and began to publish online. Editor-in-chief Piotar
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Martsau promised all journalists would keep working for its Web site (BelaPAN, 2006).
BDG had been the most respected business publication in the country, its Web site took
over as one of the most popular news resources of the Belarusian web.
Nasha Niva, a major intellectual publication, has been struggling to preserve its
print version, although it had to switch from a broadsheet A3 standard to a bulletin-like
A4. Key motivation for that change was ease of multiplication – now any owner of a
computer and a printer can download a PDF-version of Nasha Niva, print it out, and
distribute it around his or her apartment complex. But even this forced measure did not
seem to be sufficient to secure the newspaper’s existence. Authorities have continuously
been trying to ban the newspaper by closing its office in Minsk and depriving Nasha Niva
of its juridical address. This means that the newspaper could lose legal right to be
published within Belarus and would most probably be available online only.
Some newspapers, like Nasha Niva, have managed to preserve their print versions,
but closure or a distribution ban are constant threats. The biggest independent periodical in
the country, Narodnaya Volya, launched its new web site in 2006. Earlier, it had not been
active online and instead focused on the quality of its print version. Regional independent
newspapers, Vitebsky Kurier and Volnaje Hlybokaje, allowed third-party Web sites to
repost their articles online. Many well-respected news sources – RFE\RL, Charter97.org,
Nasha Niva, etc. – provided RSS-feeds6 to Web logs on election day, trying to secure that
readers would still be informed if their Web sites were blocked or hacked.
6 RSS is a family of Web feed formats used to publish frequently updated digital content, such as blogs, news
feeds, or podcasts. Users of RSS content use programs called feed "readers" or "aggregators": the user
subscribes to a feed by supplying to his or her reader a link to the feed; the reader can then check the user's
subscribed feeds to see if any of those feeds have new content since the last time it checked, and if so,
retrieve that content and present it to the user (Wikipedia, 2007).
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The problems of the print media did not stop after the elections. In September,
2006, ARCHE, an intellectual journal, was suspended for three months for alleged
violations of the Belarusian media law. During the suspension period, the journal,
however, kept on reaching its audiences via its web site (Salidarnasc, 2006).
After printing was no longer possible, some media chose innovative ways to reach
their audiences. Studunckaja Dumka (Student Thought), a popular independent youth
magazine, discontinued its print version after confiscation of the print run of one of the
issues and threats of criminal persecution of the editor-in-chief (Kennicott, 2005). The
magazine not only ported its content online but also began to publish a compact disk
edition, CD-Mag. The magazine’s staff started spreading the electronic content of the
magazine through the local area networks connecting home computers in some parts of
Minsk and other Belarusian cities. CD-Mag’s issues could also be downloaded via person-
to-person sharing systems. The new digital format allowed the magazine to use not just
static contents but also video, sound, and animation (I. Vidanava, personal communication,
August 12, 2006).
A satirical newspaper, Navinki, was suspended in 2002 for allegedly libeling the
president. After closure of Navinki’s print edition, the editorial board refocused its
activities on film-making and turned its Web site into a video blog with tidbits of its latest
productions.
6.4. Internet “Guerilla” Journalism
Belarusian journalists have increasingly turned to the Web in addition to their
regular jobs. Online journalism has become a more efficient method to reach young
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Internet users who tend to read news online and not in the newspapers. Internet is also
much less controlled and subject to censorship. It is possible to post news anonymously
and thus to avoid prosecution. Due to the severity of the Belarusian media laws, some
undercover journalists and political insiders post news to web projects rather than to
newspapers, which could lose their licenses after a ruling from the Ministry of Information.
Covert online reporting is similar to guerilla fighting. This metaphor inspired
creation of “Belorusski partizan” (Belarusian Guerilla). In November 2005, journalists
from within and outside Belarus launched an Internet project with this flamboyant title,
balancing on the line between professional and citizen journalism. The geography of the
Web site’s contributors was impressive: Belarus, Russia, Poland, Germany, and Czech
Republic. The site’s initiator, Pavel Sheremet, once was a prime time newscast host on
Belarusian Television. But soon after Lukashenka rose to power, Sheremet turned into a
personal enemy of the Belarusian president. Having being fired from the Belarusian state
television, Sheremet became a Minsk bureau chief of ORT, Russia's public television
station. During a press conference with President Lukashenka in 1996, Pavel Sheremet
reportedly asked him, “So, who is going to be [arrested] next?” The President replied, “It
could be you” (Amnesty International, 1997).
And indeed, in July 24, 1997, Sheremet, then a correspondent of ORT (Russian
Public Television) and his crew (Ovchinnikov and Zavadsky) were arrested for allegedly
crossing the border illegally. Under international pressure, the Belarusian authorities
released him three months later. Sheremet had to emigrate to Russia where he became an
ORT primetime news anchor and wrote a book about Lukashenka, An Accidental
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President. In 1998, he received a CPJ International Press Freedom Award. In his
acceptance speech, Sheremet (1998) said:
A year ago while in jail, I often had a feeling that I'd never get out. The
investigation against me and my colleagues on the pretext impossible anywhere in
the civilized world was just an example of how the government treats the mass
media in Belarus. My personal experience is proof that this pressure is hard to
withstand and dangerous. Had it not been for the support of journalists in Belarus,
Russia, and other countries, the outcome would have been hard to predict.
Another prominent journalist behind the Belarusian Guerilla project is Svetlana
Kalinkina, the editor-in-chief of Narodnaya Volya, the biggest independent newspaper in
Belarus, and earlier the editor of BDG. Kalinkina, an experienced newspaper journalist,
criticized Belarusian Internet media for being unable to use the greatest advantage of the
Web over the print media – speed. Kalinkina believed that the biggest demand online was
for breaking news reports and that Web sites offering such contents would be most popular
(Drakhahrust, 2006).
Some authors of the Belarusian Guerilla preferred to remain anonymous and hid
under soubriquets. Most of them were Guerilla insiders providing exclusive information
leaked from the power structures. It comes as no surprise that such materials attracted the
most interest from the Web site’s audience and from the Belarusian secret services.
Apart from news coverage and political analyses, the Belarusian Guerilla
published an online version of the book disclosing the horrific facts about the Belarusian
special services and alleged assassinations of Lukashenka’s political opponents. A special
section of the Web site was dedicated to Flash animation cartoons about the Belarusian
president. The Belarusian Guerilla creators also encouraged ordinary citizens to post news
on their Web site, making this project a convergence of traditional and citizen journalism.
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6.5. Livejournal Phenomenon and Rise of Blogging in Belarus
In Belarus, blogging has become increasingly popular with the general public. The
role of citizen journalism especially grew during the 2006 campaign, as the traditional
media, hampered by the pressure from the state, faced strong competition from bloggers
who kept their visitors informed about the post-electoral rallies on Minsk October Square
even at night. The most successful blogs were able to attract thousands of clicks a day,
competed with Web resources of traditional media, and were often able to win the battle
for audiences (Akavita, 2006).
The most popular blogging tool in the post-Soviet states is Livejournal. Livejournal
(often abbreviated LJ) is a virtual community where Internet users can keep a blog, journal,
or diary. Livejournal differs from other blogging sites in that it is a self-contained
community and has some social networking features similar to Friendster and MySpace.
Livejournal was started in 1999 by Brad Fitzpatrick as a way of keeping his high school
friends updated on his activities (Livejournal, 2007). The success of Livejournal in the
former Soviet Union is amazing. In Belarus alone, it has 17,521 blogs (Livejournal, 2007).
That number is equal to the population of a mid-sized regional town. And this number is
growing fast. From February to March 2007, more than a thousand of new Belarusian
blogs were registered on Livejournal.com (Pankaviec, 2007).
The growing popularity of blogs was noted by the Belarusian independent print
media. Belgazeta, Salidarnasc, BDG (Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta) ran articles
describing blogs as the new alternative information source, as a major trend in mass media,
or as vulnerable to disinformation. Sovetskaya Belorussiya (a paper directly controlled by
the Belarusian President himself) and 7 Dney (operated by the Ministry of Information)
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also ran feature articles on blogs, both playing with the idea of blogs as “princess diaries”,
a new game for teenagers and artistic people who wanted to have the world’s attention
(Populi, 2006).
In 2003, Belgazeta was the first to provide a definition of blogging for the “offline”
people:
A blog is not primarily a stream of colorless, dry information. It is the whole world
where one can find priests preaching, journalists presenting information before it is
published in official media. There are celebrities, some of them are actually the
catalyzers who brought the Russian-speaking online community into the blog
world: Anton Nossik, Norvezhsky Lesnoy, Dima Verner and many others. There
are quite a few Belarusian designers, journalists, and “builders” of Belarusian
Internet there (Dudina, 2003).
Three years later, Viktar Martinovich, another Belgazeta observer, identified
bloggers as one of the key forces in the current information wars in Belarus: there is a
whole new class of people in Belarus who access news not in newspapers, and definitely
not on TV, but from the posts of “friends” in their Livejournal.com accounts (Martinovich,
2006).
Another Belarusian independent newspaper Salidarnasc reprinted Andrey
Ilarionov’s interview from Esquire magazine, where the author described blogs this way:
Blogs are the “kitchen talk” of our times (allusion to the Soviet dissident tradition
of discussing the ongoing affairs in the kitchen). The matter is not that anyone is
forbidden to have a say – anyone can have a say, in fact. Anyone who does it,
however, has to mind the price which he’d have to pay for this freedom. Self-
censorship is more prevalent than censorship (Populi, 2006).
Livejournal was unrivaled by other similar platforms in Belarus. The efforts of
Belarusian companies to offer a domestic blogging solution yielded no fruit. The first
Belarusian blogging service was begun with the mark of censorship already on it. The rules
of this Belarus-based hosting service allowed not only eliminating blogs critical of the
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government, but even editing or deleting individual posts. So a diary containing libelous
claims against Alyaksandr Lukashenka (according to the judgment of the first Belarusian
blogging service) was deleted from the server without warnings or additional checks
(naviny.by, 2006).
With no good alternatives available, thousands of Belarusians – including many
journalists – chose Livejournal as a means to communicate with others. Lukashenka’s
former press secretary and now a renowned publicist, Alexander Feduta, has launched a
blog to keep in touch with a new generation of potential readers (personal communication,
2007). Blogging has become a hobby for Andrej Chyk of Nasha Niva and Web editor of
RFE\RL Belarusian Service, and Uladzimir Katkouski, who set up the most visited
English-language blog about Belarus. Siarhiej Dubaviec, the former editor of Nasha Niva,
has also registered on Livejournal to keep in touch with his audience. Belarusian
Wikipedia (2007) has a special page listing the Belarusian celebrity bloggers on
Livejournal. Many of them are well-known politicians, musicians, academicians, writers,
and journalists.
However, just like everywhere else, blogging is a realm where, with few
exceptions, there is very little real journalism. Bloggers covering the elections published a
lot of unchecked data. It often happened that one author would report some “breaking”
news, and in a few minutes it would be disproved by another source.
A higher, more professional level of blogging was encouraged by some established
informational Web sites. Transitions Online, a journal specializing in transformations in
Eastern Europe, initiated in 2006 a project TOL Belarus Blog focusing on transformations
in Belarus. The new blogging community united analysts from within and without Belarus.
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TOL Blogs had sections in both Belarusian and English to reach not only domestic but also
international audiences. Nasha Niva was one of the first Belarusian newspapers to
incorporate the journalists’ blogs into its own Web site. Nnmby.com is an intellectual
blogging community where a group of Belarusian analysts are mainly engaged in
discussions of Belarusian politics. Worvik.com is another blog run by philosopher
Uladzimir Mackievic and other Belarusian analysts. He also has an account at Livejournal,
unable to ignore the power of the most popular blogging service in Belarus.
By 2006, the Internet had become the only source of fast and objective information
for thousands of Belarusians deprived of independent traditional media. Some of few
remaining independent newspapers, e.g., Narodnaya Volya and Glos znad Niemna, had to
use services of printing plants abroad as Belarusian publishing houses refused to print
them. Others still are published in Belarus but face a constant danger of contract annulment
and liquidation. Online journalism and blogging became a mass practice in 2006. Some
western donors that traditionally supported print media reconsidered their priorities and
began to support Internet projects in Belarus.
The growing role of the Internet, however, poses some serious questions to both
researchers and practitioners. Was Belarusian society prepared for the transition from print
to online media? How can Belarusian Internet users resist the Internet censorship? Will
online journalism be able to maintain the principles and standards of the journalistic
profession? These issues are addressed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND CONCLUSION
With the Internet becoming the dominant communication platform for Belarusian
independent media, the following aspects of this shift are worrisome. First, it is doubtful
that the Belarusian society is prepared for the Internet age due to high Internet costs, slow
pace of Internetization in rural areas, and growing concerns about Internet censorship.
Second, the downfall of traditional media has turned many journalists away from the
profession. And third, because online journalism is, in most cases, less responsible than
newspaper journalism, the forced shift may endanger the standards of the profession. These
issues are addressed in this chapter.
7.1. Internet Censorship
The popularity of blogging was noted by the state-run newspaper Sovetskaya
Belorussia, which ran a piece on the phenomenon of Livejournal. Reporter Popova (2007)
wrote:
Virtual communication has become a routine experience for millions of users
worldwide, and a cult-status service Livejournal (LJ) in the period of last couple of
years has become a popular medium. Millions of people – LJ users – turn on their
computers with intention to write a post to LJ, read commentaries, find out news of
the Internet community. Livejournal is all about online communication with virtual
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and real friends, this is an epidemic, contagion, virus, whatever you call it, but you
cannot stop LJ.
The regime’s fear of the emerging alternative media, free of governmental control,
was so great that, on election day, Beltelecom, the Belarus’ state Internet provider,
reportedly blocked access to Livejournal.com and to other online information outlets (ONI,
2006). Yet, this extreme measure was used just for a very short time. Other more acute
methods have been employed not to stop LJ but to get the most out of it for the regime’s
benefit.
In 2007, a Livejournal blogger, Der_oper, who had been a member of oppositional
nonprofits and wrote on LJ about politics, publicly confessed that he was an agent of
Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), the Belarusian intelligence agency
(Bykowski, 2007). Der_oper’s confession attracted great media attention and prompted
discussions among Belarusian LJ users fearing that KGB agents might have infiltrated
many closed, friends-only blogging communities, as it was harder to spot an online mole
than an offline one.
A great concern for bloggers and ordinary Internet users during the electoral period
was the menace of Internet censorship in Belarus. Tut.by, the most popular Web site in the
country, and several other popular Web sites censored individual posts on their political
forums. The case that triggered concern about the Internet censorship in Belarus took place
during the second presidential election on September 9, 2001, when access of Belarusian
users to independent and opposition news resources and “mirrors”7 of these sites was
blocked. Later it was explained by technical problems of the national provider, but
blocking of sites’ “mirrors” did not match the explanation. Amidst fears that the
7 A mirror in computing is a direct copy of a data set. On the Internet, a mirror site is an exact copy of
another Internet site.
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authoritarian regime of President Lukashenka was going to close down Belarus’ political
cyberspace during the 2006 elections, Open Net Institute’s (ONI) monitored instances of
Internet censorship in Belarus. The final report posited (ONI, 2006) that
testing found little evidence of systematic and comprehensive filtering, despite
earlier ONI investigations that established the regimes capability to do so. ONI
monitoring during the elections showed that, on average, opposition and
independent media web sites remained accessible throughout the monitoring
period. ONI testing revealed a number of serious irregularities that disrupted access
to certain opposition and independent media websites at strategic moments during
and after the vote.
In particular, election day was a day of online struggle between Web administrators
and hackers (Murdoch, 2006). The former tried to keep up their sites, while the latter were
attacking them, trying to stop truthful coverage of the vote. So the site of Milinkevich, an
opposition leader, was hacked, and Charter97.org was down as a result of a flood of DoS
attacks. Different sources reported that the most visited oppositional and news sites were
inaccessible on election day within Belarus, whereas they could be accessed from abroad
or through proxy servers (McFaul et al, 2006; ONI, 2006).
When the electoral battles were over, direct attacks on Internet resources stopped.
Independent Web sites continued their activities, but the moribund independent press could
not revive, and the remaining few newspapers considered porting to online as their only
way to survive.
However, since 2006 there have been growing concerns that the Belarusian
government would begin to install an Internet filtering system similar to that in China or
Uzbekistan. Belarus has a state monopoly on the gateway to worldwide Internet access and
fixed communication telephone services. Also, by the legislation secondary (mostly
private) Internet service providers are not allowed to use satellite channels to provide
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telecommunication services. Both outgoing and incoming traffic must pass through the
nodes of Beltelecom, the primary government-owned service provider. Other providers are
prohibited from providing IP telephony services; the right to perform these activities
belongs to the primary state provider. Private businesses have to resort to illegal resources
to avoid these restrictions. Therefore in 2002 and 2003, the Belarusian court sentenced
several businessmen to prison with expropriation of all their private property for ‘illegal’
providing of IP telephony services to the population (Valoshyn, 2006).
In Belarus, government investigations into Internet usage were easier than in other
countries because the servers that provided Internet access were controlled by state firms
that willingly provided personal information to police. In 2005, Belarusian authorities
launched investigations into the Internet activities of a youth organization called The Third
Way after it posted political cartoons on its Web site ridiculing President Lukashenka.
Third Way member Paval Marozau had to seek political asylum in Estonia after being
threatened by the KGB (Synovitz, 2005).
Resorting to online journalism did not guarantee security from the regime’s
persecution of journalists either. In addition to the aforementioned Pahonia problems,
there were other similar cases. Journalist and human rights activist Natalya Kaliada was
fined 160 euros on February 2, 2004, for posting material on the Web site of the Charter
97 (www.charter97.org), which is not recognized by the authorities (RWB, 2006). When
working in Belarus, I was warned by the prosecutor for posting to an unregistered news
Web site (www.sumiezza.org). Such instances compelled reporters to use sobriquets and
fake names. Most informational Web sites are hosted outside of country for security
reasons.
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Organizations that assisted journalists and ordinary citizens with information
technologies faced problems, too. For example, the foreign ministry refused to renew the
accreditation of the Minsk office of the U.S. International Research & Exchange Board
(IREX-Promedia), which had organized training seminars for journalists, provided free
access to the Internet, hosted the Web sites of about 30 independent newspapers, and made
extensive online photo and print archives available to the media (Minikes, 2003). Another
example is the closure of the Hrodna city NGO resource center Ratusha, which provided
free satellite Internet access to nonprofit organizations in the city (HRW, 2006).
For the last few years, Reporters Without Borders has included Belarus in its list of
top 15 enemies of the Internet. According to the organization’s report, the Belarusian
regime uses its monopoly of the communications system to block access to oppositional
Web sites when it chooses, especially at election time (RWB, 2005).
7.2. The Pace of Internetization
Although during the period studied, Internet penetration in Belarus remained
amongst the lowest in Europe, the user-base was on the rise. Estimates suggested that the
number of Internet users doubled between 2002 and 2005 and reached close to 2 million or
20 percent of the population. However, only some 5 percent were thought to be
“permanent” users due to the high cost of access (Doroshkevich, 2005). In this respect, the
majority of Lukashenka’s core constituency – the rural workers, the middle-aged, and the
elderly – were not yet active Internet users. A 2003 survey on the political attitudes of
Internet users and non-users found that users were more likely to be skeptical of the
Lukashenka regime’s policies and propaganda, trusted independent news sources more
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than state-run organs, and were more inclined to actively support the opposition (ONI,
2006).
The gap between the capital city and the regions was especially notable in the
spread of broadband Internet. Private providers that offered Internet connections in Minsk
had not yet come to smaller towns. Most Belarusians had slow dial-up connections, and
fast DSL connections were very expensive (for economic, but, as some analysts suspect,
also for political reasons). Young IT-savvy Internet users figured out that they could buy
one expensive DSL link and then create a local area network with their neighbors, thus
sharing the bandwidth and the costs (Katkouski, 2006). Despite multiple efforts undertaken
by the Ministry of Information and Beltelecom to outlaw such networks, their number was
growing in all major cities of the country. People in regional towns and villages, however,
mostly resorted to using slower and cheaper dial-up connections. The majority of
Belarusians could not afford an expensive DSL connection, and broadband home networks
with shared Internet costs were not available in rural areas.
The question of accessibility of news is crucial even for such a computerized
country as the United States. Various scholars questioned the preparedness of American
society for a transition of the press to online delivery of news. Unlike authoritarian
Belarus, the United States is a democracy with a 210,080,067 Internet users as of
November 6, 2006; that is a 69.6 percent penetration (Internet World Stats, 2007). There is
a danger that some part of the nation will be left out, uninvolved, unwired. In Belarus,
Internet is still a buzz word for the young and educated elite, not an information source for
everyone.
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Valery Karbalevich, an analyst with the Minsk-based Strategy Political Analysis
Center, argued that
it was mainly opposition supporters and people who lived in urban areas who
usually visited Belarusian independent Internet sites. The Internet was used mainly
by democratically orientated people, people who [already] supported the
opposition's values. It was natural that these people were visiting the sites of the
candidates. They were looking for their programs and so on and so forth. But to tell
the truth these people did not need to be converted [to the opposition's cause] (Mite,
2006).
Polls indicated that the majority of those who supported Lukashenka were
pensioners and people who lived in villages or small towns – a group often far removed
from modern technologies. According to a 2001 Internet user survey, the vast majority of
Internet users at the time were based in Minsk, were under the age of 30, and had slow
connections (Mite, 2006).
The gap between Minsk and the provinces might explain why most national media
stepped forward into the digital age, while the editors of regional publications feared to
lose their readership if they discontinued their print versions. According to the information
provided by the Ministry of Information, in 2006 there were 8 press agencies, 1,148 print
media (748 newspapers [136 regional], 400 magazines), 54 television stations, and 154
radio stations registered in Belarus (Ministerstvo Informacii RB, 2006). An E-belarus.org
survey (2006) revealed that only 6 percent of all these media had their online avatars: six
news agencies (64 percent), 58 print media outlets (5 percent) (11 percent national and 12
percent regional), and 23 television and radio stations (11 percent). The front page of
Tut.by was the most popular news site with approximately 60,000 daily visitors. The next
five top sites were date.by, naviny.by, charter97.org, bdg.by, svaboda.org. Only 4 percent
of Belarusian media were purely online projects.
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The Internet age had been coming more slowly to Belarus than to other countries in
the region. The demand for free information, however, was higher because of the scarcity
of traditional independent media. The dearth of unbiased information turned thousands of
Belarusians to the worldwide Web. The history of newspaper journalism in Belarus is very
short. The country has become independent in 1991, and Lukashenka came to power in
1994. Mackievich (2007) observed that
when the Internet comes to Belarus, there will not be morning and evening papers –
there is no necessity for them. Such things are either upheld by the tradition, or are
momentarily taken over by more modern media. Thus, I assert that Belarusians, in
terms of informatization and internetization, should outrun other European
countries. Not that Belarus is richer, but its population’s demands are more aptly
satisfied by the Internet than by the traditional media. Hence I understand that a
senior citizen who wants to read Narodnaya Volya would go online sooner than the
one who reads Sovetskaya Belorussia, because the latter can get it in print anyway.
Instead of the mostly unidirectional information flows offered by print journalism,
The Internet allows for multiple streams of communication running through multiple
parties, allowing for multiple types of messages (Singh, 2003). The rise of Belarusian
online journalism diversified the information field, allowing more interaction between
journalists and citizens and urging political debate and critical evaluation of state policies.
4.3. Conclusion. Implications of Online Journalism
Belarusian online journalism and blogging became a widespread practice in 2006,
and this trend has continued in 2007. Let us consider the worst case scenario – even if all
independent newspapers close, there will be underground printouts, RISO8-quality
bulletins, and Web sites that will deliver the uncensored news to Belarusians. But will they
8 The Risograph is a high-speed digital printing system manufactured by the Riso Kagaku Corporation and
designed mainly for high-volume photocopying. Increasingly, it is more commonly referred to as a RISO
Printer-Duplicator, due to its common usage as a network printer as well as a stand-alone duplicator.
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be able to substitute for the traditional print media? Merritt delineated the following
characteristics of the independent press: depth, professional objectivity, accountability,
layered process of fact-checking and editing, community coherence, and multiple sourcing.
Newspapers are not a particularist voice, and the best of newspaper journalism has a brand
– readers know what to expect. He argued that newspapers developed these qualities
through years of experience, high standards, and journalistic ethics and norms (Merritt,
2006). Online journalism, and especially blogging, can scarcely boast most of these
advantages. The Center for Citizen Media (2007) proclaimed the following principles of
citizen journalism: (a) accuracy; (b) thoroughness; (c) fairness; and (d) independence. It
can be questioned whether the Belarusian traditional press was able to meet these
standards, but, similarly, there are concerns that many Belarusian online sources are even
less able to do so. The decline of standards is a very serious issue when transition from
print to online takes place. Some news Web sites in Belarus – and this is an international
trend – have narrowed the boundaries between their own content and users’ blogs, and
have added elements of citizen journalism to their Web sites. For instance, one of the most
respected and trusted news sources in the Belarusian language, the Belarusian service of
RFE\RL, urged its Internet audience to submit reports, photos, and text messages during
the political protests in Minsk. In 2006, it also launched an evening program “Abloga” that
cites the most interesting posts in the Belarusian blogosphere and regularly offers
interviews with prominent bloggers.
There are, however, serious concerns that the Belarusian government will attempt
to install Internet filtering equipment and to limit access to oppositional Web sites. On
February 10, 2007, a new law obliged owners of cybercafés and Internet clubs to report
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Internet users looking at illegal web sites (IFEX, 2007). According to the new law, Internet
café owners or their authorized agents must keep an electronic registry of the domain
names of the sites accessed by users. The electronic log should contain at least at 12-month
history of all connections. State Security agents, police, and state control inspectors are
authorized to review the logs in cases as listed by legislation. When violations are
suspected, Internet café managers should inform law enforcement about the cases
(Doroshkevich, 2007). 
ommercial public Internet centers had been the only places where
Internet activity could not be properly monitored by the authorities – mainly because of
anonymity of users in such places. Meanwhile, all the users of home Internet connections
can be easily monitored without notice because providers can directly map IP and home
phone numbers. It is generally easier for users of Internet at work and in home local area
networks to conceal themselves because there is a large number of people behind one
common IP-address (BM, 2007).
On the other hand, instances of Internet censorship are counterbalanced by the
development of information technologies, spread of broadband and satellite Internet, and
gradual decrease of Internet access costs. Wireless and mobile technologies are also
rapidly developing. As of January 1, 2006, 4.09 million people subscribed to the
Belarusian cellular services. That is 1.7 times higher than in January 2005. The level of
mobile market penetration was 42 percent, compared to 25 percent in the beginning of
2005 (PointTopic, 2007).
Whereas traditional journalism is endangered, blogging has become a hobby for
thousands of Belarusians. In Belarus, editors often choose not to rely solely upon staff
members but to urge ordinary citizens to cooperate with their news organization. Many
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journalists, unable to feed their families, have resigned from reporting positions at
independent newspapers, emigrated, or changed careers. Personal security concerns, low
salaries, limited opportunities for professional growth have turned many talented
journalists away from the profession. Some newspapers, especially regional ones, are
unable to provide good working conditions to reporters; most of their staff works as
freelancers.
Online journalism, mostly unpaid, offers, at least, a safe haven to hide under a
sobriquet and, in majority of cases, to avoid prosecution. It is also much less challenging in
terms of ethical norms and standards. Paradoxically, there are also some benefits of this –
online journalists do not resort to self-censorship and often publish hard-kicking articles
that would be redlined by newspaper editors. The Internet is also much faster, especially
when many independent newspapers are printed abroad and transported into the country –
and this takes a lot of time. Online journalists can easily post their news from any
computer connected to the Internet and even from cellular phones. With no domestic
independent electronic media available within Belarus, the Internet has become the most
up-to-date source of information for many Belarusians. The Web site of the Belarusian
service of Radio Liberty is reportedly more popular than its over-the-air broadcasts. This is
explained by growing Internet usage and decline in sales of shortwave radio receivers. In
2007, Andrej Dynko resigned from his post as the editor-in-chief of Nasha Niva and took
the job of the editor of the newspaper’s Web site. This position is not less important, as the
readership of the Web site is higher than that of the print version of the newspaper.
The slow pace of Internetization and fears of Internet censorship in Belarus pose a
critical question: was the Internet revolution really happening in Belarus, or was the
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Internet had become a merely temporary way for Belarusian independent journalists to
survive during times of oppression? The role of the new alternative media was huge during
the elections. However, it was not big enough to eliminate the information blockade.
The failure or success of a democratic transition unequivocally relates to the
absence or presence of a free press. Freedom House rated Belarus 185th in its press
freedom ranking. This is almost the bottom of the list, just above Sudan, Equator Guinea,
Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Libya, Burma, Cuba, Turkmenistan, and North Korea (Freedom
House, 2006).
When I started collecting data for my thesis in 2005, I did not imagine I would be
ending it amidst the near ruins of Belarusian print journalism. The case of a forced
transition from print to online is unusual and analysis of its short and long-term outcomes
may enhance our understanding the dangers of losing traditional, independent media as an
accessible source of information. The free press played a crucial role in the democratic
transitions of Ukraine and Georgia, it and remains a key element of the watch dog
mechanism needed to supervise governmental actions.
In this thesis, I point out that newspaper journalism plays a major role in sustaining
democratic discourse, assuring political accountability, and fostering nation building and
the formation of civil society. To a large extent, the failure of democratic revolution in
Belarus was brought about by the deep cleansing of the information field undertaken by
the regime. But the response of the civil society was also feeble and disproportionate.
Readers failed to intercede for their newspapers, although journalists expected that. And
the Internet was not widespread enough to substitute for the print media. The case of
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Belarus is a forewarning of a premature transition to online for editors around the world.
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